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I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the scholarly reaction to systems of preventive detention has 
been hostile.  Negative judgments are especially prevalent among penal 
theorists who hold nonconsequentialist, retributivist rationales for criminal
law and punishment.  Surely their criticisms are warranted as long as we 
confine our focus to the existing systems of preventive detention that
flagrantly disregard fundamental principles of legality and desert.
Nonetheless, I believe that many of their more sweeping objections tend 
to rest too uncritically on doctrines of criminal theory that are not always
supported by sound arguments even though they are widely accepted. 
I will contend that we cannot fully evaluate the morality of preventive
* Professor of Philosophy and Law, Rutgers University.  Generous support for
this Article was provided by the Straus Institute for the Advanced Study of Law and 
Justice, New York University.  Helpful suggestions were offered by Fellows of this
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Restriction of Liberty held at the University of San Diego School of Law in April 2011. 
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deprivations of liberty as a general practice unless we are prepared to 
reexamine some of these doctrines.  Any such reexamination would
probe into deep and divisive questions about the nature and justification 
of state punishment and the substantive criminal law.  I will hazard
positions about several of these difficult questions, but I am aware that
many of my claims are highly controversial.  I will not go to great lengths to
support them here; a sustained defense of these positions would require a 
separate treatise.  I reach two conclusions.  First, we have little choice 
but to adopt views on these questions if we hope to fully assess the 
morality of preventive deprivations of liberty.  Second, if we challenge 
conventional wisdom and adopt the positions I favor on these topics, we 
will have a hard time citing serious principled objections to preventive 
detention unless we share similar objections to state punishment.  When 
suitably modified, given modes of preventive detention can be made to 
be defensible. 
These two conclusions, I believe, are relatively novel.  Many legal
philosophers go to great lengths to differentiate preventive detention 
from punishment and are far more sympathetic to the latter than to the
former.  If I am correct, their discussions of the morality of preventive 
deprivations of liberty are at best incomplete because they presuppose a
great deal of orthodox doctrine without attending to the normative
questions about criminal law and punishment I examine here.  If they
were willing to rethink these issues, they would probably have fewer
reservations about the morality of preventive detention.  Indeed, preventive 
detention may actually be easier to defend than state punishment.  Even 
if this latter supposition is mistaken, I contend that transforming this 
practice into state punishment is among the most promising strategies for 
justifying it.  If implemented, these changes would improve preventive 
detention, making it far more humane and acceptable.  I am sure that the
transformation I will describe would make states far less likely to resort 
to preventive detention, but that is a different matter altogether.  My only
claim is that these changes are possible in principle. We cannot
demonstrate their possibility, however, without reexamining some of the
most intractable controversies in the philosophy of criminal law.
II. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
Several preliminary comments are needed before I turn to the crux of
my argument.  First, no consensus about the definition of preventive 
detention can be gleaned from the voluminous literature that surrounds 
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it.1  Many writers use this term to refer specifically to one or more
particular systems of preventive detention that currently exist.  Although
I will conclude that no grounds of principle differentiate all systems of
preventive detention from punishment, I am quite certain that none of 
these actual practices, such as the indefinite confinement of suspected 
terrorists in Guantanamo, qualifies as state punishment or should be
evaluated by reference to the standards applicable to criminal justice.2 
I should not be interpreted to lend support to these existing practices.
Even those scholars who purport to discuss the topic of preventive
detention more broadly tend to characterize it by the procedures used to 
impose it.  Stella Elias, for example, understands preventive detention as 
“detention without trial or charge.”3  I see no reason, however, to include 
procedural features in a definition of preventive detention.  We should
not stipulate, for example, that only the executive and not the judiciary
can order persons to be detained preventively or that fair hearings are 
necessarily denied to such persons.  Adding such elements to a definition 
is bound to add to the difficulties of defending this general practice.  In
what follows, I construe preventive detention as any state practice of
confining individuals in order to prevent them from committing future 
harms. 
I claim that the arguments I will present render it difficult to reject
preventive detention in principle. But several empirical misgivings make
this inquiry much less urgent in practice. As virtually every commentator 
has been quick to point out, our present ability to predict future
dangerousness is meager.4 In addition, the use of prediction in criminal 
1. “There is no standard, internationally agreed-upon definition of preventive 
detention.”  Stella Burch Elias, Rethinking “Preventive Detention” from a Comparative
Perspective: Three Frameworks for Detaining Terrorist Suspects, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 99, 110 (2009).  The author proceeds to construct a useful taxonomy of practices
of preventive detention distinguished by eight criteria: “[The] legal basis for detention,
notification, appearance before a judicial, administrative, or other authority, maximum 
period of time in detention, access to legal counsel, right to a fair and public hearing,
judicial review, and rules regarding interrogation.”  Id. at 128. 
2. See generally Douglass Cassel, Pretrial and Preventive Detention of Suspected
Terrorists: Options and Constraints Under International Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
811 (2008) (discussing the grounds, conditions, and procedures justifying preventive
detention for security purposes).
 3. Elias, supra note 1, at 102. 
4. Of course, some social scientists are more pessimistic than others. See, e.g., 
David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limitations of Diagnostic Precision and Predictive 
Utility in the Individual Case: A Challenge for Forensic Practice, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 259, 269–72 (2010) (expressing serious reservations about the ability to predict 
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justice may be counterproductive even when its reliability is not in 
question.5  We should not be willing to tolerate too many false positives 
and undesirable consequences before we lose confidence that an institution
of preventive detention is acceptable. Moreover, in many and perhaps 
most of the cases in which we are able to predict proclivities to cause 
future harm with tolerable precision, the state has alternative means to 
reduce these harms that are more easily justified and thus preferable to 
preventive detention.  We possess an arsenal of weapons to decrease the
likelihood of future harms; preventive deprivations of liberty are close to
a last resort among them.  I will not discuss these alternative strategies, 
although many exist.6 
Because they are so widely appreciated, I need not belabor these
empirical points.  Unless our ability to predict future harm is relatively 
accurate, the case in favor of any system of preventive detention
collapses.  Thus, it is no objection to my project to allege that prediction 
is highly fallible.  Henceforth I simply assume that our predictive powers 
are reasonably good.  How good must they be?  I add only a single
comment to the familiar uncertainties and alleged disadvantages of 
predicting dangerousness.  Because my general aim is to determine whether 
preventive detention can be transformed into state punishment—and
whether the rules that authorize it can be made into criminal offenses— 
we should not demand that predictions of dangerousness have a high
degree of accuracy unless we are prepared to make similar demands about 
the criminal laws we accept.  I contend that many penal statutes are best
construed as inchoate crimes of “risk-prevention”—crimes designed to
prevent harms before they occur.  Drunk driving is an obvious example, but
the many possession offenses in our criminal codes will serve as my
favorite illustrations.  The reason the state bans the possession of given
items such as brass knuckles, for example, is because persons who
possess them are thought to create an unacceptable risk.7  How accurate
is the prediction that persons who possess brass knuckles will cause 
future harm?  I do not know; I pose this rhetorical question to suggest 
that we should not require the state to be significantly more accurate in
predicting future dangerousness when we assess a practice of preventive
future dangerousness).  These authors conclude that rates of error make predictions of 
violence in individual cases practically meaningless.  See id. at 263. 
5. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 3 (2007). 
6. Proposals to rectify the causes of crime typically represent modes of prevention. 
One of many strains of preventive thought is discussed under the heading of “situational 
crime prevention.”  See, e.g., ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME 
PREVENTION (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2000). 
7. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 908 (West 1998 & Supp. 2011) (proscribing 
“metal knuckles”). 
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detention that has been structured along the lines I will propose.  We 
need not require, for example, that persons will cause harm beyond a 
reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence in order to
be justified in depriving them of liberty.  These high standards of proof 
are and ought to be required in order to be convicted of a crime.  But no 
such standard is or ought to be applied to justify the enactment of an
inchoate offense designed to reduce the risk of future harm.  Perhaps no 
inchoate crime of risk-prevention—certainly not the offense of drunk 
driving—could hope to satisfy this exacting test.
In addition, I assume that the kinds of cases in which we are most
tempted to favor preventive restrictions of liberty are those in which the 
harm to be averted is severe.  No one should be eager to detain persons 
to prevent them from committing minor offenses such as shoplifting.  To
do so would probably be counterproductive.  In addition, enacting new 
crimes to disable persons from committing minor offenses would create
proportionality difficulties—a matter to which I will return.  I am not 
persuaded, however, that this condition is satisfied in each of the
circumstances in which preventive detention is currently utilized.
Fortunately, it is clear that in at least some of the cases in which
preventive detention is currently used—against persons Richard Falk has
dubbed “megaterrorists”—this assumption almost certainly is met.8  In  
any event, my objective is not undermined if we conclude that preventive 
detention should be used sparingly—far more sparingly than some of its 
proponents seem to believe.  This conclusion would not differentiate 
preventive detention from state punishment because the latter should also 
be used less frequently.  We have too much criminal law and too much
punishment, and a general theory of criminalization is needed even more 
urgently than a theory about the conditions that warrant preventive 
detention.9 
I say that we cannot fully evaluate the morality of preventive 
deprivation of liberty without reexamining some of the deepest and most
divisive questions about the morality of punishment because I admit that
some progress can be achieved without attending to the issues I discuss. 
Sensible and significant contributions to this topic have been made even
8. As the name suggests, megaterrorists pose unacceptable risks of causing
enormous harm. See RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR 7–8 (2003). 
9. See generally  DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (arguing for a refined theory of criminalization to address the 
trends of overcriminalization and overpunishment). 
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by theorists who neglect the problems I address.  Many commentators 
have defended various means to improve existing systems of preventive 
detention.  The morality of these practices depends partly on the fairness 
of the procedures that are used to implement them, and these procedures
can be assessed quite apart from the topics I treat here. 
I further contend that we cannot find serious principled reasons to 
oppose preventive detention if we believe punishment to be justified. 
I concede that a few principled barriers will remain after my efforts have 
been completed.  In particular, as I will discuss in greater detail below,
the principle of proportionality functions differently in the two domains.
I will argue that this difference is smaller than first appearances indicate 
and that it is not fatal to my endeavor to show how preventive detention
might be transformed into state punishment. 
I also say that we cannot fully evaluate the morality of preventive 
deprivation of liberty without addressing some of the deepest and most
divisive questions about the morality of punishment.  The we in this
sentence is intended to apply to those of us who hold retributivist theories of
penal sanctions.  Like many other isms, the nature of retributivism is
deeply contested.10  For present purposes, I understand retributivism to 
be the general name for a group of theories that regards desert as central
to efforts to justify the substantive criminal law and state punishment. 
Commentators do not qualify as retributivists if they neglect desert
altogether or award it only a marginal role in their endeavors to find a 
rationale for punishment.11 Of course, we may disagree about whether a 
given theorist affords desert a prominent or marginal place.  No formula
exists to mark this contrast; it turns out to be controversial whether any
number of contemporary theorists should be classified as retributivists.
Because I regard consequentialist justifications of punishment as
indefensible, I will have little more to say about them here. 
It is crucial to understand both the motivation for this Article and the
role retributivism plays in the argument that follows.  Liberals committed to
human rights and the rule of law are justifiably horrified by existing
systems of preventive detention in the real world.  Consequentialists are 
hard pressed to respond to this problem because they have always
regarded the prevention of future harm as the central purpose of criminal
law and punishment.12  Thus, those who are skeptical of preventive 
10. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Retrieving Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON
THEORY AND POLICY 1, 1 (Mark D. White ed., 2011) (discussing ambiguities in how 
retributivism is understood). 
11. See id. at 18. 
12. They tend to respond by pointing out that the unfettered use of prediction in
penal justice may begin a slide down a slippery slope with enormous potential for abuse.
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detention and want to guard against the abuses to which it might lead are
best advised to locate their reservations within a retributive framework 
that promises to treat persons according to their deserts.  Admittedly,
retributivism has come under heavy fire in the past few years, although
its opponents tend to be better at recounting its shortcomings than to
describe what should replace it.  Theorists who propose to substitute 
desert with deterrence at the heart of their penal philosophy should be
careful what they wish for.  Retributivism offers the best prospects to 
reform practices of preventive detention and render them more humane
and acceptable to liberals.  But even retributivists must be cautious in 
renouncing preventive goals.  As I will argue, abandoning prevention 
altogether as a legitimate objective of penal justice would jettison huge
parts of criminal law that ought to be retained.  Existing systems of
preventive detention are objectionable precisely because they do not 
conform to the standards retributivists employ to evaluate the substantive
criminal law and the punishments deserved by persons who violate it. 
The beginning of a solution to this problem is to appreciate that these 
systems undercriminalize rather than overcriminalize.13 
What should we conclude if an existing system of preventive
detention is not structured in the ways I will recommend?  Suppose, that 
is, that it is not transformed into state punishment as I understand it. 
Does it follow that such a system cannot be justified?  Not at all.  What 
follows is that any such defense will differ in crucial respects from a 
defense of punishment.  In all likelihood, a justification of preventive 
detention would have to show that the deontological constraints we 
typically preserve when rights are implicated would have to be relaxed
in light of the enormous risks posed by those we want to detain
preventively—such as megaterrorists.14  I count myself among those
“threshold deontologists” who put aside my nonconsequentialist principles 
For a further discussion of these concerns, see generally Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon
Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 481 (1987). 
13. See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Orders: A Problem of 
Undercriminalization?, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59, 60 (R.A. Duff et 
al. eds., 2010). 
14. For a critical examination of these strategies, see generally Don E. Scheid,
Indefinite Detention of Mega-Terrorists in the War on Terror, 29 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 1 
(2010).  For thoughtful responses to Scheid’s article, see Symposium, Exchange: Don 
Scheid on Indefinite Detention of Mega-Terrorists, 30 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 68 (2011). 
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when the harms to be averted are sufficiently grave.15  Although I take
such an attempt to justify preventive detention seriously, it encounters 
several difficulties I will not pursue here.16  My aim is to show that a  
defense of some sort of preventive detention need not appeal to a 
supposed “catastrophe exception” to our willingness to protect rights. 
Instead, a defense can be developed squarely within a retributive
justification of criminal law and punishment. 
My ensuing arguments will depend on controversial positions about 
rules and doctrines of criminal law theory.  Many commentators reject
my positions, and I am aware that my arguments against their views are
inconclusive.  I am confident, however, that I can solve one problem 
sometimes raised against preventive deprivations of liberty.  Paul Robinson 
protests that preventive detention is often “cloaked” as criminal justice.17 
According to this objection, preventive detention is a subterfuge or ruse,
cleverly disguised to be something it is not.  I fully agree that we should 
not resort to deceit in criminal justice.  My aim is to lift the cloak that 
allegedly conceals this practice and to describe what would be required 
to make the rules that authorize preventive deprivations of liberty into a 
respectable part of the criminal law.
III. CAN PREVENTIVE DETENTION QUALIFY AS PUNISHMENT?
It may seem odd to insist that a full evaluation of the morality of 
preventive deprivations of liberty should depend on deep questions 
about the justification of criminal law and state punishment.  Despite the 
obvious similarities between these two practices, a number of legal
philosophers think it is relatively clear that preventive detention is not 
punishment and cannot be assimilated to it.  I construe these philosophers to
believe not only that existing systems of preventive detention are not 
punishment at the present time but also that preventive detention cannot 
be reformed to become punishment.  Deprivations based on risks of
future criminality, no matter how well grounded, are widely regarded as 
an abuse of the criminal law.  Paul Robinson succinctly expresses one 
version of this view: “[T]he use of the criminal justice system as the 
primary mechanism for preventing future crimes seriously perverts the 
15. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the Borders of Consequentialist 
Justifications: The Scope of Agent-Relative Restrictions, 27 LAW & PHIL. 35, 42, 95 
(2008) (defending the position that deontological constraints must be relaxed when the
consequences are sufficiently grave).
16. See, e.g., Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to 
Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871 (2011) (discussing
consequentialist difficulties with preventive detention schemes). 
17. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001). 
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goals of our institutions of justice.”18  I propose to challenge this
assumption or, at a minimum, show that the difficulties of defending it 
on principled grounds are greater than many legal philosophers suppose. 
To begin, we must identify what the criminal law is. How do we
know whether a law enacted by the state qualifies as one of its criminal 
laws?  I advance the first of many controversial theses: the criminal law
just is that body of law that subjects persons to state punishment.  If 
punishment is the sanction the state is authorized to inflict for violations 
of a rule, it follows that that rule is part of its criminal law.  Conversely,
if a rule is part of the criminal law, it follows that the state is authorized 
to punish persons who violate it.  Thus, the rules that allow preventive 
detention should be conceptualized as part of the criminal law—as 
criminal offenses—if and only if it is appropriate to categorize preventive
detention as punishment.  Is it?  Despite widespread agreement that 
preventive detention is not punishment, we need to be clear why most
penal theorists are convinced that the two institutions are conceptually
distinct.  In other words, we must examine why most commentators are 
persuaded that preventive restrictions on liberty cannot qualify as 
punishments so that the rules that authorize these sanctions cannot be 
conceptualized as part of a state’s criminal law.  In order to answer this 
question, we must clarify what punishment is—what makes a particular 
sanction an instance of state punishment.  The key to this inquiry,
I believe, is to focus on what it is about punishment that requires
justification.  Although legal philosophers obviously disagree about how
to defend punishment, they also disagree about what it is about 
punishment that must be defended.  I contend that state punishment
requires a justification because it contains at least two essential features
that are normatively problematic: what I will call “hard treatment” (or 
“deprivation”) and “stigma” (or “censure”).
Few will deny that punishment includes the first of these ingredients.
As H.L.A. Hart recognized, a state response to conduct does not qualify
as punitive unless it involves “pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant.”19 These consequences might be of various
kinds: persons might be killed, imprisoned, mutilated, fined, deported, 
18. Id. at 1434.  In what follows, I ignore Robinson’s unexplained use of the word
primary.  To my knowledge, no one believes that criminal justice is the preferred
mechanism to prevent future harms.
 19. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 4 (1968). 
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banished, or the like.  I will generalize by saying that all modes of
punishment involve hard treatment or deprivation.  Hart also appreciated, 
however, that not all state inflictions of consequences normally considered
unpleasant are modes of punishment.  Consider taxes, license revocations, 
benefit terminations, and other disqualifications.  These deprivations do 
not typically count as punitive, despite the severe hardship they may
cause.  Thus, a second condition must be satisfied before a sanction 
should be categorized as an instance of state punishment, although there 
is more debate about how this additional condition should be formulated.  
I contend that a state response to conduct does not qualify as punitive
unless it is designed to censure and to stigmatize.20 For this reason, I 
concur with those many legal philosophers who believe that punishment 
has an important expressive dimension. 
If this account were wholly adequate, we would lack the resources to 
explain why preventive detention is not state punishment.  It goes without 
saying that preventive detention involves a hardship or deprivation.  It is 
only slightly less obvious that most impositions of preventive detention 
are stigmatizing and involve censure.  Of course, I recognize some exceptions 
to this generalization.  But unless the person preventively detained has 
some disability or excusing condition that renders blame unwarranted, it 
would be facetious to contend that the detainee is not blamed. Surely an
enormous amount of stigma is heaped upon the typical megaterrorist.
Why, then, is preventive detention almost universally regarded as something 
other than punishment?  Why are the rules that authorize it generally
treated as something other than criminal laws?
In the remainder of this Part, I will critically discuss four of the many 
possible answers that might be given to this basic question. Each of
these answers has its merits; many suffice to show that systems of
preventive detention that presently exist are not properly regarded as part
of the state’s penal justice system.  I will argue, however, that none of 
these four answers creates insuperable barriers to conceptualizing 
preventive detention as punishment.  If I am correct, no insurmountable 
reasons of principle differentiate criminal offenses from the rules that
authorize preventive detention. As a result, a complete moral assessment of
either practice cannot afford to neglect an evaluation of the other.
I characterize the first two answers to my basic question as “formalistic”
inasmuch as they can easily be overcome with a few changes in positive 
law.  The first possible answer invokes the principle of legality: nulla 
poena sine lege. According to the demands of legality, punishments are 
20. For an impressive defense of the view that punishment includes both hard 
treatment and censure, see generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
(1993). 
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imposed only on persons who have committed, or are believed to have 
committed, a crime.21  But persons preventively detained, this first answer
continues, have not committed a criminal offense.  Hence they are not 
punished.  As one commentator expresses the point, “Criminal punishment 
is based solely upon a conviction for an offense and can occur only if 
there is such a conviction.  Preventive detention is based solely upon a 
prediction concerning future offenses and can occur only if there is such 
a prediction.  Therefore, preventive detention is not criminal punishment.”22 
How should we assess this first possible answer?23 Only a handful of
commentators are likely to contend both that preventive detention is a 
punishment and that it is imposed for something other than a criminal
offense. Few theorists openly reject the principle of legality and recommend
punishing persons who have not committed a crime.  Still, this answer
fails to show that preventive detention cannot be punishment. In the first
place, it is question begging. If preventive detention qualifies as punishment 
according to our best understanding of the nature of punishment, and we 
accept the conceptual claim with which I began, it follows that the rules
that authorize it are part of the state’s criminal law, even if they are not 
presently regarded as such. 
In any event, any problem raised by this first answer is easily
rectified—at least in theory.  Whether or not a person commits a criminal 
offense depends solely on the content of positive law.  If we want to
punish the persons we propose to preventively detain but need to ensure 
that they are guilty of a criminal offense in order to do so, we need only
amend positive law to enact new statutes for these persons to breach.  If 
predictions of future dangerousness are reasonably accurate—as I have
presupposed—they must be based on traits of persons derived through 
actuarial generalizations.24 A massive amount of empirical research has 
21. Hart, it might be recalled, included this answer in his influential definition of 
“the standard or central case” of punishment.  See HART, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
 22. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 12 (2003). 
23. Among other difficulties, it is hard to interpret the “based upon” relation Slobogin
uses to formulate his thesis.  I understand it to be identical to the “for” relation—although
the latter is also ambiguous. See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
24. I am aware of the supposed contrast between actuarial and clinical bases for 
predicting dangerousness that has been a staple of the literature since the publication of a
work written by Paul Meehl. See PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION
(1954).  Even clinical predictions, however, must be based on generalizations derived from
previous observations. 
 1183






    
      









    
      
   
   




   
   
  
   
 
 
   
  
tried to identify these factors.25  Although many concrete proposals have
been defended,26 I make no effort to canvass or evaluate them here.27 
Henceforth I simply refer to the traits that predict future dangerousness 
as x, y, and z.  Again, I do not for a moment belittle the difficulties of 
identifying these traits and thus of enacting offenses to proscribe them.28 
The material elements of the new statutes to be enacted would include 
these traits—the properties or characteristics of the persons we want to
detain on which our predictions of future dangerousness are based.29 
Admittedly, depending on their content, many complaints could be brought
against such statutes.30  Most notably, they might amount to “status 
crimes” in violation of the supposed “act requirement” of criminal law.31 
This admission is important, and I will return to it in Part IV.  For now, I 
simply point out that the state could resolve whatever problems are
associated with the principle of legality by creating new statutes that
would be violated by the persons we propose to detain preventively.  If
the absence of positive law is the problem, the enactment of positive law 
is the solution. 
If the state were to draft new statutes that would be violated by the
persons we propose to detain preventively, a second formalistic attempt 
to show why preventive detention is not punishment would also fail. 
Whether a sanction qualifies as punitive, it might be thought, depends 
partly on the procedures that must be observed in order to inflict it. 
Many of these procedures are constitutional in stature.  For example, no 
25. Much of this research focuses on adolescents.  See, e.g., DAVID P. FARRINGTON
& BRANDON C. WELSH, SAVING CHILDREN FROM A LIFE OF CRIME 17–25 (2007) (focusing 
on protective factors to reduce adolescent crime). 
26. For example, see the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) discussed in 
John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 409–10 (2006). 
27. For reasons to believe that none of the available instruments predicts violence 
significantly better than the others, see Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current 
Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI., Feb. 2011, 
at 38, 40. 
28. In particular, the traits that predict a willingness to engage in acts of terrorism 
may be quite unlike those that predict dangerousness generally.  Suicide bombers, for 
example, deviate from the profile of persons at risk of suicide for nonideological reasons.
John Monahan, The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928722. 
29. Although I will not attempt to formulate any such offenses, it is likely that
some such traits already appear as elements of existing crimes. For example, the Supreme 
Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the giving of material
aid to designated foreign terrorist groups in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010). 
30. If they include political speech or religious affiliation as material elements, for 
example, these statutes would encounter obvious First Amendment problems. 
31. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968); Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660, 665 (1962). 
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one may be punished in the absence of a trial that includes several well-
known safeguards, such as the right to confront witnesses.  But few persons 
who are preventively detained are tried and afforded the protections that
famously surround the criminal process.  As we have seen, some
commentators go so far as to define the practice of preventive detention 
to dispense with a trial or charge.32 
Again, only a handful of theorists are likely to contend both that
preventive detention is punishment and that the many constitutional
protections routinely afforded to criminal defendants may be ignored. 
This combination of recommendations would fly in the face of numerous
well-settled principles of constitutional law.  Like its predecessor,
however, this purported difference between punishment and preventive 
detention is easily remedied.  We need only mandate that appropriate 
procedures be observed whenever persons are preventively detained.  Of
course, many commentators would vehemently resist or even ridicule
this recommendation.33  Officials worry that the need to charge and try 
individuals—or to read them their Miranda rights—would undermine 
most or all of the supposed practical advantages of preventive detention.34 
Much has been written both for and against this allegation; I will not 
comment on whether it is true.  My point is that we could extend all of 
the procedural protections currently available to criminal defendants to
those persons we want to preventively detain. 
Neither of these two formalistic answers gets to the heart of the
matter.  One would not suspect that the problem of conceptualizing 
preventive detention as punishment could be solved so easily—by enlarging 
the scope of procedural protections or by enacting new offenses.  The 
next two difficulties, however, are potentially more serious and cannot 
be overcome by a few alterations in positive law.  The third possible 
answer is as follows: many theorists contend that preventive detention 
cannot be punishment and that the rules that authorize it cannot be part 
of the state’s criminal law because persons can only be punished for past 
behavior.  According to this train of thought, punishment for future 
32. See, e.g., Elias, supra note 1, at 112. 
33. Some purport to find the very idea difficult to imagine.  See, e.g., Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 
with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
69, 81 (1995). 
34. For a discussion of the procedural difficulties of prosecuting terrorists in criminal 
court, see generally Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why
Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 1 (2009). 
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dangerousness is incoherent.  As Robinson expresses the point, “[I]t is
impossible to ‘punish dangerousness.’  To ‘punish’ is ‘to cause (a person) to
undergo pain, loss, or suffering for a crime or wrongdoing’—therefore,
punishment can only exist in relation to a past wrong.”35  Slobogin is
even more succinct: “Indeed, the concept of ‘punishment’ for some future
act is incoherent.”36 
How much credibility should be given to this third answer?  Among 
other difficulties, it purports to resolve the ancient debate between
retributivists and consequentialists by invoking a definition.  If persons 
can only be punished for what they have done in the past, it is hard to
see how punishment could possibly be justified by its tendency to attain
a future good.  Although I have already indicated that consequentialist
theories of punishment should be rejected, the argument under consideration
would dispense with them much too easily.  The deficiencies of
consequentialist justifications of punishment must be demonstrated on 
normative grounds rather than through conceptual analysis.  In other 
words, no account of what punishment allegedly is can refute 
consequentialist rationales.  The “definitional stop[s]” on which this
answer depends have a dubious legacy in philosophical controversies 
about punishment.37 
Definitions take us only so far.  In order to provide a substantive 
response to this third argument, as well as to provide a fair assessment of 
the ancient debate between consequentialists and retributivists, it is
crucial to recognize an important ambiguity in understanding what some 
response is done for.38 In asking what punishment is imposed for, we
may want to know either (1) in virtue of what is punishment inflicted, or 
(2) what is the purpose for which punishment is inflicted?39  These 
questions are different, and a failure to contrast them has led to enormous 
confusion about punishment generally and systems of preventive detention 
in particular.  Richard L. Lippke, for example, writes, “The more worrisome
feature of preventive detention, in my view, is that it punishes individuals 
for crimes they will commit rather than for ones they have committed.”40 
If Lippke is correct, preventive detention must be conceptualized as an 
 35. Robinson, supra note 17, at 1432 (citation omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1180 (College ed. 1959)). 
 36. Slobogin, supra note 22, at 12. 
37. See HART, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
38. For a preliminary discussion of ambiguities in the “for” relation, see George P. 
Fletcher, What Is Punishment Imposed for?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101 (1994). 
39. On a related point, see the insightful discussion of the contrast between the 
“conditions” and the “objects” of responsibility in R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME:
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 82–89 (2007). 
 40. Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders and Preventive 
Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 385 (2008) (emphasis added). 
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instance of what has come to be known as “pre-punishment.”41  I hope to
avoid the controversy that surrounds pre-punishment because I believe
that preventive detention need not be understood in this way. I admit 
that the answer to my first question necessarily looks backward.  In 
this sense, any punishment under a system of preventive detention is
imposed for or in virtue of possession of the characteristics x, y, and z.  
Even though these characteristics are made into elements of offenses
because they predict future dangerousness, the persons to be punished 
already possess them; the future is immaterial to their liability.  It does 
not follow, however, that the answer to my second question must look 
backward as well.  As consequentialists recognize, it is perfectly coherent
to impose punishment for or for the purpose of attaining a future good. 
A system of preventive detention is an excellent illustration; it imposes 
punishment for traits already possessed in order to avert subsequent harm.
Moreover, the generalizations about the criminal law on which this 
third answer depends should be rejected.  In the first place, as Stephen 
Morse describes in impressive detail, many current well-established
doctrines and practices in our criminal justice system already reflect a
preventive rationale.42  To cite just one of several examples, all jurisdictions
punish recidivists more harshly than first-time offenders.43  More to the
point, many existing substantive offenses that have created only minimal
controversy among penal theorists are best construed to prevent future 
harm. Numerous statutes enacted in every state do not require the
defendant to have caused harm. The state would have little need to
create “anticipatory” or “inchoate” offenses, such as attempt, conspiracy, 
and solicitation, unless the prevention of future harm is a legitimate 
objective of the penal law.  I trust that no one would say that the statutes
that proscribe attempts are not part of the criminal law or that the 
sanctions imposed on persons who violate these statutes are something
41. Recent discussion of pre-punishment has been enormous.  For an important 
contribution, see generally Saul Smilansky, A Time To Punish, 54 ANALYSIS 50 (1994).
For an application of this perspective to preventive detention, see generally Lucia
Zedner, Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?, 11 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 261 (2007). 
42. See Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 
270–71 (1999); see also Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some
Kind Words for Preventive Detention, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781, 781–82 (2011) 
(noting that “preventive detention . . . has long been, and continues to be, a core part of
Anglo-Saxon legal practice”). 
43. The rationale for this familiar practice is bitterly contested. See  JULIAN V.
ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER
PERSPECTIVES 3 (2008). 
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other than punishments.  And the list of crimes designed to prevent 
future harm is not confined to this familiar triad.  Many offenses that are 
not typically regarded as inchoate punish conduct that creates a risk of
harm rather than harm itself.  For example, the bulk of traffic offenses, such
as speeding and drunk driving, share this rationale.  So too do drug
offenses, which account for hundreds of thousands of persons behind bars.44 
Finally, scores of possession offenses—to be considered in greater detail
below—must be added to the list.45  Although criminal theorists have a
variety of ingenious devices to dispute my contention, the fact remains
that a large number of penal statutes are designed to prevent harms
before they occur.  Thus, the laws enacted under a scheme of preventive 
detention need not be different in kind from many existing criminal 
offenses.  Statutes designed to prevent future harm are neither unusual 
nor deviant.
How likely must the risk of future harm be in order to enact a crime of 
risk-prevention?  I raised this issue in connection with possession
offenses, such as the possession of brass knuckles.  The culpable states
of recklessness and negligence both require defendants to create a
“substantial” and “unjustifiable” risk before liability may be imposed, 
and I believe that similar standards should apply to all crimes of risk-
prevention.46  Still, commentators have identified no quantifiable 
threshold beyond which a given risk qualifies as substantial.47  Although no 
formula governs the answer, I am sure that many existing crimes of risk-
prevention fail to meet this demanding standard.48  Criminal laws 
designed to prevent risk have been allowed to grow “in an unprincipled 
manner” and violate many of the principles of criminalization we should
preserve.49  By the same token, however, many crimes of risk-prevention
satisfy this standard.
I conclude that none of these three answers is adequate to explain why 
preventive detention cannot be construed as punishment.  The fourth and 
most plausible reason, I submit, begins by noticing that a characterization of
44. The rationale for these offenses is criticized in DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, LEGALIZE
THIS!: THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING DRUGS 44–45 (2002). 
45. See infra Part IV. 
46. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 159–77. 
47. For empirical evidence that this standard is not met by statutes that punish 
HIV-positive persons who risk transmission of infection by engaging in sexual activities, 
see Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 49–50), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808034. 
48. I argue that the large number of offenses designed to prevent the risk of harm
rather than harm itself is a major cause of our current predicament of overcriminalization. See
HUSAK, supra note 9, at 164. 
49. See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales
and the Limits of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW
279, 302 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). 
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punishment that includes only deprivation and stigma is incomplete.  My
analysis of the nature of punishment must be supplemented.  In order to
qualify as a punishment, it must also be true that each of these two
features is brought about intentionally.  In other words, state sanctions 
do not qualify as punishments because they happen to impose deprivations 
and stigmatize their recipients.  The very purpose of a punitive state
sanction is to inflict a stigmatizing deprivation on the offender.50  To be
sure, the state may have ulterior motives in punishing.  A punitive response 
to behavior may be the most effective way to deter future crimes, promote
social cohesion, protect the rights of law-abiding citizens, vindicate the
sacrifices of the law-abiding, and the like.  But the existence of these ulterior 
motives does not undermine my claim that a sanction is not a punishment 
without a purpose to deprive and censure.  No other state institution is 
quite comparable in this respect.  Many state sanctions impose hardships 
and several others stigmatize.  Some state practices, such as involuntary 
confinement of the dangerous mentally ill, do both simultaneously.51  But  
these sanctions differ from punishments because they lack a punitive
intention.  Although they knowingly cause a stigmatizing deprivation,
that is not their point or purpose. 
If I am correct about the nature of punishment, we must examine the 
intentions of those state actors who authorize preventive deprivations of 
liberty in order to decide whether the sanctions they impose qualify as
punishments.52  What is the intention of the state in imposing preventive
detention?  Again, different systems of preventive detention are supported 
by different rationales; no single answer will suffice in all cases.  When 
the state preventively detains mentally abnormal sexual predators who 
have completed their original sentences, for example, it is plausible to 
suppose that it lacks an intention to punish.53  Although it is notoriously 
difficult to identify the content of intentions—especially when a
50. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 96–97 (2001). 
51. The stigmatizing effect of civil commitment is conceded in Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979). 
52. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue of whether a sanction qualifies as 
punishment rests heavily on the intentions of the state authorities who impose the 
stigmatizing deprivation. See Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v. California in 
the Wake of Jones v. Los Angeles: Avoiding the “Demise of the Criminal Law” by
Attending to “Punishment,” 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 432 (2008). 
 53. Involuntary commitment of persons who have served their sentence for a crime 
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act has been held not to constitute a punishment. 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368–69 (1997).  The alleged absence of an intent to
punish allows the characterization of this proceeding as civil.  See id. at 361–69. 
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collective entity like the state is involved—it is not hard to imagine that 
state actors would prefer to adopt some other means to protect victims of 
mentally abnormal violent offenders if they could do so without imposing a
stigmatizing deprivation on the unfortunate individuals we reluctantly 
confine.54  If so, no suitable rationale for punishing these individuals can 
be developed within a retributivist framework.  If it is restructured along 
the lines I propose, preventive justice is an acceptable response only for 
those persons who deserve punishment. 
But whatever may be the case with mentally abnormal violent sexual 
offenders, it is hard to believe that persons who pose dangers of
megaterrorism are similar in this regard.  Surely the state has a punitive 
intention in preventively detaining these individuals.  Few of us would 
be receptive to a device to prevent megaterrorists from causing enormous 
destruction that spares them from both deprivation and stigma.  Hence 
this final means to show that preventive detention is not punishment, and 
that the rules that authorize it are not part of the criminal law, must
be rejected—at least for some categories of persons who are preventively
detained. 
The supplemented account of punishment that includes a punitive 
intention on the part of those who impose it provides a partial explanation of
why punishment has proved so difficult to justify.  It plays a similar role 
in a normative assessment of preventive detention.  How can we hope to 
justify an institution that not only happens to stigmatize and deprive but
whose very purpose is to do so?  It is a gross understatement to say that 
these practices treat persons in a manner that typically is wrongful. 
More to the point, they treat persons in a manner that implicates their 
moral rights.55  In addition, retributivists agree that ordinary utilitarian
gains do not provide an adequate justification for imposing these sanctions. 
If these claims are correct, I believe that we should countenance a right 
not to be punished.56  Because I have found no principled reason to
differentiate some systems of preventive detention from punishment, we 
have an equally good ground to countenance a right not to be preventively
detained.  It does not follow, of course, that neither practice can be justified. 
54. One commentator maintains that “with civil detention institutions there is no
reason in principle why . . . they cannot be made pleasant and agreeable places.” David 
Wood, Reductivism, Retributivism, and the Civil Detention of Dangerous Offenders, 
9 UTILITAS 131, 137 (1997). 
55. No standard terminology about rights has taken hold.  Actions “implicate” a 
right when they are contrary to that right.  I intend this term to be neutral about whether 
those actions infringe or violate a right; that is, whether they are permissible or impermissible. 
56. I admit this claim to be controversial.  For a challenge, see Miriam Gur-Arye,
Comments on Douglas Husak’s Overcriminalization, 1 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD.
21, 21 (2010), in which Gur-Arye argues that different kinds of punishment implicate 
different rights. 
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According to the view I tend to favor, rights are infringed when an action
implicates rights justifiably, and rights are violated when an action
implicates rights unjustifiably.57  Thus, infringements, no less than
violations, implicate rights.58  The very same considerations that show an 
instance of punishment or preventive detention to be justified show our
right not to be punished or preventively detained to be infringed rather than
violated.  The ultimate normative challenge for a theory of preventive 
detention—as for a theory of punishment—is to identify the conditions 
under which the rights it implicates may be overridden rather than violated. 
I conclude that a system of preventive detention can be conceptualized 
as punishment.  The pressing question is whether it can be justified as 
such.  I now move from conceptual to normative considerations—where
the problems are even more formidable than those already encountered. 
IV. CAN PERSONS DESERVE TO BE PREVENTIVELY DETAINED?
To this point I have neglected to mention what may be the most crucial
factor in attempts to differentiate the rules that authorize preventive
detention from those that impose state punishment.  Retributivists hold
that desert plays a central role in explaining why punishment, when 
justified, infringes rather than violates our right not to be punished.  But 
it may seem unlikely that desert can play a parallel role in justifying 
preventive detention—in explaining why our right not to be preventively
detained is infringed rather than violated.  The reason is simple, deceptively 
so.  As I have already mentioned, desert is thought to be necessarily
backward looking, and the rationale for preventive detention looks
forward. Thus, even if preventive detention can be punishment, it cannot
be justified as punishment.  Some commentators appear to believe that
nothing more needs to be said to explain why our thoughts about the
justification of punishment have little significance for our thoughts about 
the morality of preventive detention.59  Don Scheid contends, “In theory,
57. The distinction between rights infringements and rights violations was first 
drawn in Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 47 
(1977). 
58. For a challenge to my use of the distinction between infringements and 
violations of rights, see John Oberdiek, Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating 
Distinction and Its Place in the Theory of Rights, 23 LAW & PHIL. 325 (2004). 
59. “Dangerousness and desert are distinct criteria that commonly diverge.  Desert 
arises from a past wrong, whereas dangerousness arises from the prediction of a future
wrong.”  Robinson, supra note 17, at 1438. 
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if not always in practice, a sharp distinction is made between punishment 
for past wrongs and detention to prevent future wrongs.  The rationales for
the two are very different.  Criminal desert arises from past wrongdoing, 
whereas dangerousness is estimated future wrongdoing.”60 
An analysis of desert is needed to assess this claim.  As virtually all
theorists recognize, desert is a tripartite relationship between (1) who is 
deserving, (2) what is deserved, and (3) why it is deserved.  In other 
words, all desert claims are of the following form: A deserves Ω in virtue 
of p.61  The issue to be assessed is whether the properties that warrant 
preventive detention—characteristics x, y, and z—might form a basis for
desert—more particularly, a basis for deserved punishment.  If desert
claims necessarily look backward and the rationale for preventive
detention necessarily looks forward, it would seem that no one can
deserve to be punished for the reasons that lead the state to detain one 
preventively.  Thus, any justification of preventive detention cannot be 
grounded in desert.  Because desert is central to the correct—retributivist— 
defense of punishment, it follows that punishment is not justified for the 
reasons that warrant preventive detention.
This position is often advanced as a part of a grand theory.  According 
to Michael Moore, for example, “Anglo-American criminal law is largely a
formalized description of the requirements of retributive justice.”62  In order
to serve retributive justice, he continues, “criminal law must punish all 
and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally
wrongful action.”63 Moore contends that those who lack virtue, but do
not exhibit it through bad actions, do not deserve punishment because they
“have done no wrong.”64 Because persons the state proposes to detain 
preventively need not have performed a wrongful action, it follows that
their punishments cannot be deserved and thus are unjustified.  Should we
endorse the grand theory on which this argument rests?  Of course, Moore 
is correct that persons who have not performed a “bad action” have done
no wrong. Because they have not acted, they cannot have engaged in
wrongdoing.  But does it follow that they cannot deserve to be punished? 
Many criminal theorists would agree with several of Moore’s claims.
Morse, for example, concurs: “[D]esert requires wrongdoing.”65 But
why?  Are only doings a desert base? Or are they the only desert base for
 60. Scheid, supra note 14, at 14. 
61. See JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 55, 65, 93 (1973). 
 62. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 20 (1997). 
63. Id. at 35. 
 64. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 53 (1993).
 65. Morse, supra note 42, at 270. 
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punishment in particular?  And why should we think that the criminal law 
has a single function, such as to exact retribution for past wrongdoing? 
Most laypersons would be astonished to learn that leading philosophers of
law believe that crime prevention is somehow antithetical to criminal
justice. Special deterrence is typically listed among the respectable
objectives of punishment.  No less than in other domains of law, I believe 
we should accept pluralistic accounts of the bases of desert and of the 
purposes of the criminal sanction. 
I am skeptical of the claims of Moore and Morse despite reaffirming 
my allegiance to retributivism.  Of course, I agree that criminal liability
in the absence of desert is objectionable.  If we are confident, however,
that persons satisfy whatever accurate criteria we devise to determine
that they pose a substantial danger of serious future harm, why should 
we conclude that they cannot be deserving of punishment?  In this Part, I
will explore the question of whether the rationale for preventive detention 
might be given a basis in desert.  My support for an affirmative answer
draws from my retort to the first formalistic answer to the conceptual
challenge of construing preventive detention as punishment.  As I indicated, 
predictions of future dangerousness are based on characteristics x, y, 
and z of the person to be detained.  I contend that these properties can
ground a judgment that punishment is deserved.  After all, persons may
merit condemnation or stigma for having these properties; why can it not 
be wrongful to possess whatever properties predict future dangerousness
and comprise the elements of newly enacted penal statutes?66  Thus, 
even if Scheid is correct to suppose that penal desert arises from
something in the past, we need not construe punishment to be for—in 
virtue of—future dangerousness even when we resort to preventive
66. Many theorists offer answers to this question that differ from my own.
According to one commentator, “The difference between criminal punishment and civil 
or regulatory deprivation of liberty is that the former reflects moral blameworthiness 
deserving condemnation whereas civil law provides protection through non-condemnatory
confinement or supervision of potentially dangerous people.”  Denise Meyerson, Rights, 
Risks, Statistics and Compulsory Measures, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 507, 522 (2009). Another
commentator alleges that “under the prediction/incapacitation model we do not punish 
people for wrongs they did, but we make them suffer for possessing certain traits or 
belonging to certain groups.  This is wrong from a moral point of view.”  Yoav Sapir, 
Against Prevention? A Response to Harcourt’s Against Prediction on Actuarial and
Clinical Predictions and the Faults of Incapacitation, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 260 
(2008).  I maintain that these claims are false insofar as they suggest that possessing the 
characteristics that accurately predict future dangerousness cannot be morally wrongful. 
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detention.  Instead, punishment can be imposed for—in virtue of—the 
possession of whatever characteristics predict future dangerousness.67 
What might be said against my analysis?  As far as I can see, at least
three reasons might be advanced to deny that persons can be deserving 
of punishment in virtue of possessing the characteristics that predict 
future dangerousness.  I alluded to one such reason in responding to the 
first formalistic answer I described in Part III: any supposed desert base 
that is invoked to support preventive detention could well amount to a
status offense that would violate the supposed act requirement of the 
criminal law.  Most theorists concur with Moore and subscribe to the act
requirement and thus believe that desert requires a past act.68  Earlier, I
contended that many inchoate offenses such as attempt and possession
are designed to prevent future harm.  Even if I am correct, the persons
who commit these offenses are typically regarded as deserving of
punishment because the act requirement is said to be preserved by the 
statutes they violate.  A defendant who commits a criminal attempt, for 
example, acts wrongly by taking a “substantial step” toward an illegal 
objective.69  This step is thought to render the defendant eligible for a
deserved punishment. 
If it is true that the act requirement explains why many theorists
believe that persons cannot deserve to be preventively detained despite 
possessing properties x, y, and z, their degree of confidence in the 
proposition that no one can deserve to be preventively detained should 
be no higher than their degree of confidence in the act requirement itself.
If we reject the act requirement, we no longer could cite this principle to 
conclude that no one can deserve to be preventively detained.  Elsewhere, I
have mounted a sustained critique of the act requirement.70  I have
argued that what theorists typically regard as the act requirement in
67. Because I propose to find a desert base for preventive detention, I am unsure
whether my proposals amount to a form of what Morse calls “pure” prevention.  See
Morse, supra note 42, at 265. 
68. But compare this with the view of R.A. Duff, who proposes to replace the act 
requirement with an action presumption.  See DUFF, supra note 39, at 95–115. 
69. This criterion differentiates preparation from attempt in MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.01(1)(c) (1962). 
70. See generally Douglas Husak, The Alleged Act Requirement in Criminal Law, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 107 (John Deigh & David 
Dolinko eds., 2011) [hereinafter Husak, The Alleged Act Requirement in Criminal Law] 
(contending that criminal law does not contain an act requirement but noting that
theorists often mistakenly believe it does); Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Responsibility 
Require an Act?, in  PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 60
(Antony Duff ed., 1998) (arguing that the criminal law has a control requirement rather
than an act requirement); Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2437 (2007) (concluding that the act requirement should be rejected and 
suggesting an alternative principle that assumes criminal liability requires control). 
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criminal law is better construed as a distinct but related set of normative 
principles designed to ensure that persons have control over any state of 
affairs for which they are punished.71 No one should be punished for
what is beyond their control, and an effort to treat preventive detention 
as punishment must preserve this fundamental requirement.  As long as 
the possession of the characteristics x, y, and z are under the control of
persons the state preventively detains—as I would insist—punishment 
would be compatible with the principle I propose to substitute for the act
requirement.72 
The control requirement would rule out a great many candidates for 
penal offenses that might accurately predict harm.  Race, gender, or age, 
for example, could not be among the elements of these crimes,
notwithstanding their predictive power.  Punishments for the offenses 
that satisfy this requirement need not be objectionable; they would not 
violate any of the foundational ideas theorists hold sacrosanct.  They
would not treat us as though we lack free will or exhibit disrespect for 
our status as autonomous, rational agents, for example.73  Thus, even if
the offenses I propose to enact to achieve the objectives of preventive 
detention qualify as status crimes, nothing need be normatively suspicious 
about them.74 But I will not rehearse these controversial arguments here. 
In what follows, I will briefly question why theorists seem so certain that
the offenses we tend to accept in our penal codes preserve the act
requirement. 
Although I suspect that the problem I will describe can be generalized
to many inchoate offenses, I will illustrate it by reference to possession
offenses.  State penal codes include over one hundred possession offenses, 
ranging from minor violations to the most serious category of felonies 
punishable by life imprisonment.  These include possession of a toy gun, 
graffiti instruments, public benefit cards, credit card embossing machines, 
gambling records, usurious loan records, obscene materials, eavesdropping 
71. I defend this claim in each of the articles referenced supra note 70.
72. Apparently Lippke is skeptical about whether the properties of defendants that 
warrant their preventive detention ever are under their control.  See Lippke, supra note 
40, at 386. 
73. Thus, my general framework of responsibility is compatible with that invoked
by Alec Walen. See Walen, supra note 16, at 937. 
74. The inclusion of status crimes in a penal code would raise many new normative 
issues.  For example, would character evidence become more salient? See Ted
Sampsell-Jones, Preventive Detention, Character Evidence, and the New Criminal Law, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 723, 723, 725 (2010). 
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devices, noxious materials, and a host of others.75  Several of these offenses, 
of course, are enormously controversial and should be repealed.76  Still, 
many crimes of possession, such as that proscribing the private possession 
of weapons of mass destruction, are clearly justifiable.77  In other words, 
these offenses are a legitimate use of the penal sanction.78  But no one 
should say that the state of possessing something—like the weapons in 
my garage—is an act.  Possession is better construed as a state of affairs
than as an act.  If criminal liability ever is imposed for—in virtue of— 
the state of possession, as seems clear, it follows that criminal liability is 
not always imposed for an act.  If the act requirement should be construed 
to hold that only acts are and ought to be the objects of penal liability, it 
is false both descriptively and normatively.79 
Of course, orthodox thought in criminal law rejects my claim that 
possession offenses are counterexamples to the act requirement.  The 
Model Penal Code (MPC), for example, stipulates that “[p]ossession is 
an act . . . if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing 
possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to 
have been able to terminate his possession.”80  Taken literally, however, 
this provision is nonsense and seeks to preserve the act requirement by 
fiat.  The state of affairs in which I possess a weapon is not an act, and 
this state of affairs is not magically transformed into an act simply
because I am “aware of [my] control thereof for a sufficient period.”81 
I have not been performing continuing acts of possessing each of the 
shirts in my closet since the moment I knowingly acquired them several 
years ago.  No state of mind or passage of time can perform the alchemy
75. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Possession Paradigm: The Special Part and the 
Police Power Model of the Criminal Process, in  DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE
SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91, 96–97 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 
2005). 
76. Drug offenses are perhaps the most controversial examples.  See generally
DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS (1992) (arguing that punishments for drug use 
are unjustified).
 77. “[T]heorists agree that criminal responsibility for possession should not be 
ruled out in principle . . . .”  DUFF, supra note 39, at 106. 
78. Andrew Ashworth, by contrast, believes that the use of possession offenses to
challenge the act requirement “looks like backwards reasoning: it more or less concedes
that stretching is required.”  See Andrew Ashworth, The Unfairness of Risk-Based 
Possession Offences, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 237, 241 (2011).  Although Ashworth raises a host 
of persuasive objections to the justifiability of many possession offenses, I do not believe 
that their incompatibility with the supposed act requirement is among them.  In any
event, he does not hold all possession offenses to be unjustifiable. 
79. The act requirement must be given a different formulation if it is to be
preserved.  For a discussion, see generally Husak, The Alleged Act Requirement in Criminal
Law, supra note 70. 
 80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (1962). 
81. Id.
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needed to convert nonacts into acts.  I conclude that the foregoing provision 
from the MPC should not be interpreted to specify the conditions under 
which the state of possession is or becomes an act.
Before proceeding further, I need to deflect a possible objection at the 
outset.  Suppose that my grounds for rejecting the act requirement are 
misguided and that orthodox liberal theorists have been correct to insist
that penal liability must contain an act.  Suppose also that possession
offenses preserve the act requirement.  It is important to notice that these
suppositions would not require a major revision in my efforts to make
preventive detention acceptable to retributivists.  We need only stipulate
that the properties or characteristics x, y, and z must contain an act.  Just
as the content of penal statutes must not abridge important values such
as freedom of speech or religion, the content of the penal statutes enacted to
punish such persons as megaterrorists must include an act.  Or so it 
might be contended. 
I now turn to a second possible reason to deny that persons can be 
deserving of punishment in virtue of presently possessing the characteristics
that predict future dangerousness.  This reason derives from the principle
of proportionality.  According to this train of thought, even if those 
persons we propose to preventively detain are deserving of punishment, 
the goals of preventive detention assess the extent of their punishments 
incorrectly. Proportionality typically is construed to require the severity
of punishment to be a function of the seriousness of the crime.82  If the
state enacts crimes to punish persons we want to detain preventively,
proportionality entails that their sentences should be a function of their 
desert.  But the objective of preventive detention necessitates that these
persons be confined until they no longer are dangerous.  How, then, is 
preventive detention compatible with a retributive theory of punishment 
that awards a prominent place to desert and proportionality? 
I regard this second problem as the most worrisome of those entertained 
thus far.  I offer two responses, each of which concedes that a retributive 
justification of punishment must preserve proportionality.  First, note 
that it is not always clear how to preserve proportionality; its demands 
are notoriously difficult to identify.83  Who can say what sentences 
82. No canonical formulation of the principle of proportionality can be found. See
ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING 
THE PRINCIPLES 131 (2005). 
83. Many theorists believe that the difficulties of satisfying the demands of cardinal
proportionality are sufficient to warrant the rejection of retributive theories.  See, e.g., 
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persons deserve for committing the newly enacted crimes containing
elements x, y, and z?  Fortunately, this difficulty is not so overwhelming 
in the present context.  Consider possible views about the seriousness of
the newly enacted crimes committed by persons the state proposes to
detain preventively.  The seriousness of a crime is (mostly) a function of
the severity of its harm and the culpability of its perpetrator.84  Because I 
have already presupposed that only severe harms could warrant
preventive detention, it follows that the crimes these defendants commit
would be extremely serious as long as offenders possess a high degree of 
culpability. And they do; no one will balk at saying that the culpability 
of megaterrorists, for example, is great.  Thus, the newly enacted crimes
these defendants would commit would tend to be incredibly serious,
making perpetrators eligible for lengthy periods of confinement.  As a
result, we need not worry that the objectives of preventive detention will 
authorize long terms of incarceration in violation of proportionality. 
Although these sentences will indeed be lengthy, it is doubtful that
violations of proportionality will occur.  The sentences allowed by
proportionality and those required for preventive purposes are likely to 
come apart only if the new crimes we enact are not serious. 
I hazard a second response to this problem that may apply even to less 
serious crimes, although my thoughts on this score are more tentative. 
One way to argue that the demands of proportionality can be satisfied by 
preventive detention construes the crimes that trigger this sanction as
inchoate. Once again, consider the example of possession statutes.85 
These crimes are “continuous” in the sense that they are committed over
and over again as long as persons remain in possession of whatever item 
is proscribed.  The ongoing nature of these offenses may extend even 
after a defendant is convicted.  Persons who are punished the appropriate 
amount for illegal weapon possession, for example, would presumably
be eligible for an additional punishment if they persist in possessing the 
illegal weapon as soon as they complete their sentences.  Theorists need
not regard the additional sentence as disproportionate; its rationale would
be identical to and no less justifiable than the term initially imposed. 
Similarly, defendants who continue to exhibit characteristics x, y, and 
Greg Roebuck & David Wood, A Retributive Argument Against Punishment, 5 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 73, 74, 78–79 (2011); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 
60 EMORY L.J. 585, 628–31 (2011) (describing how individual differences between
defendants complicate endeavors to make the severity of the punishment proportionate to
the seriousness of the offense). 
84. See Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-
Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 (1991). 
85. Of course, analogies with possession offenses can be used for justificatory purposes
only if these offenses are legitimate uses of the penal sanction.  For serious reservations
about many possession offenses, see generally Ashworth, supra note 78. 
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z—and thus are eligible for preventive detention—remain deserving of 
punishment as long as they possess these properties.  We need not 
construe any part of their sentences as an added punishment for the 
original crime that implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.  Instead, we might regard them as perpetrating a new offense 
each moment they remain dangerous.  The desert base for their punishment 
is continuous; it survives as long as they exhibit the characteristics that 
predict future harm.  Of course, like defendants who divest themselves 
of the illegal weapon, the state loses its reason to detain them preventively 
when they no longer exhibit the properties x, y, and z.  As long as we 
ensure that defendants have control over these characteristics, they need
not worry that they could not possibly lose the status that rendered them
eligible for liability in the first place.
A third and final reason to deny that preventive detention can be
conceptualized as deserved punishment is quite unlike the foregoing
two.  It begins by asking exactly how desert is thought to figure so
prominently in an explanation of why justified punishments infringe 
rather than violate our right not to be punished.  In other words, we need
to inquire how desert is relevant or significant to a retributive justification
of punishment.  A complete answer to this question could consume an
entire treatise.  Some retributivists apparently think that desert is the only
consideration to which we may appeal in constructing a justification of
punishment.  According to purists like Moore, for example, “[I]t is a 
sufficient reason for us to have punishment institutions (i.e., the criminal 
law)—and for us to use those institutions to mete out a particular
punishment to a particular person on a particular occasion—that the 
person deserve to be punished.”86  Consequentialist considerations play
no role in this determination because “the moral desert of an offender is 
a sufficient reason to punish him.”87 Moore holds that the value of
inflicting deserved punishments derives not from its consequences but
solely from the value of implementing a principle of retributive justice. 
He writes, “[P]unishing the guilty achieves something good—namely, 
justice—and . . . reference to any other good consequences is simply
beside the point.”88 
 86. MOORE, supra note 62, at 104. 
87. Id. at 88. 
88. Id. at 111. 
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If this account of the significance of desert to a retributive philosophy 
of punishment were correct, it would succeed in distinguishing preventive 
detention from punishment.  Future consequences are relevant to the
justification of preventive detention; the practice exists for the purpose
of preventing subsequent harm.  But I do not accept a purist account of 
the role played by desert in an adequate theory of punishment, and the
grounds for rejecting it should make retributivists more sympathetic to 
preventive detention.  Unlike Moore, I do not believe that the institutions 
of criminal law and punishment can be justified solely as a means to 
implement a principle of retributive justice—even though I share the
basic controversial intuition that the state of affairs in which culpable
wrongdoers are punished is no worse than and may even be better than 
the state of affairs in which they are not.  Even so, consequentialist
considerations must be included in a justification of punishment.  Moore 
has told only part of the story—indeed, a very important part. To
complete the account, however, one must also show that the benefits of 
state punishment are worth its costs in the real world.  Moore describes 
one of these benefits in impressive detail: punishment is a means to 
implement retributive justice by giving culpable wrongdoers their just 
deserts.  But what of the staggering costs of punishment?  Elsewhere, I
have referred to three of these costs as the “drawbacks” of punishment.89 
First, the expense of our system of criminal justice is astronomical.90 
Our penal institutions cost huge sums of money that might be used to 
achieve any number of other valuable goods taxpayers might prefer: 
education, transportation, funding for the arts, and the like.  Second, our 
system of punishment is susceptible to grave error.  Despite the best of
intentions, punishment is bound to be imposed incorrectly, at least 
occasionally.91  Third, the power created by an institution of punishment
is certain to be abused.  Officials can and do exceed the limits of their 
authority, intentionally or inadvertently.92  As administered by the state
rather than by a deity, citizens should be reluctant to create an institution 
of criminal justice because of these three drawbacks.  In combination, 
89. For earlier thoughts, see DOUGLAS HUSAK, Why Punish the Deserving?, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 393, 396–97 (2010). 
90. See  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at tbl.1.11.2006 (2006), available at http://www.albany.edu/source 
book/pdf/t1112006.pdf (showing the United States’ total corrections direct expenditure 
for the fiscal year 2006 as $40,413,017). 
91. See Causes and Remedies of Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug. 
18, 2011), http://innocenceproject.org/understand; see also Symposium, The Faces of 
Wrongful Conviction, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
92. See, e.g., ANTHONY V. BOUZA, UNBOUND: CORRUPTION, ABUSE, AND HEROISM
BY THE BOYS IN BLUE 111–15, 127–30 (2001). 
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these drawbacks render state punishment extraordinarily difficult to 
justify. 
Sensitivity to the drawbacks of punishment undermines the thesis that 
desert suffices to justify penal sanctions.  Some retributivists seemingly 
suppose that their task is complete when they show that the punishment 
of culpable wrongdoers increases, or at least does not decrease, the 
amount of intrinsic value in the world, even if no gain in utility is produced
when criminals receive their just deserts.  I understand why retributivists
tend to dwell on this crucial point, inasmuch as consequentialists are 
unwilling to concede it.  But this demonstration does not suffice to
justify an institution of punishment.  Retributivists must show not only
that giving culpable wrongdoers what they deserve is intrinsically good 
but that the amount of the value that punishment produces is sufficient to 
offset the drawbacks that inevitably result when an institution of criminal
justice is created.  Perhaps the value of realizing a principle of retributive 
justice would justify punishment in a possible world in which none of the
foregoing drawbacks existed.  In a divine realm, for example, no expenses
are incurred to exact retribution, the innocent are never punished, and
corruption and abuse are nonexistent. Unfortunately, this possible world 
differs from the world we inhabit.  We understand why citizens balk
when asked to fund an institution that has the sole objective of realizing 
retributive justice.  Persons might reasonably prefer to use their tax 
dollars for any number of other worthy purposes.93  I conclude that the
value of realizing retributive justice, by itself, is insufficient to justify the
creation of an institution of criminal justice with the formidable drawbacks
I have described.  Something else needs to be said on behalf of criminal
law and punishment. 
What is needed to solve the problem I have posed—to show why the 
state is justified in imposing deserved punishments that infringe rather
than violate our rights—is some additional value that punishment can be 
expected to promote.  This good, when added to the value of attaining 
retributive justice, will justify the creation of an institution of criminal
law and punishment.  Many candidates for this value might be proposed;
systems of penal justice serve a multiplicity of important objectives.  But 
93. The difficulty of showing that the amount of the value that punishment 
produces is sufficient to offset the drawbacks that inevitably result when an institution of
criminal justice is created can be solved only by locating part of the justification of 
criminal law and punishment within political philosophy rather than moral philosophy.
See HUSAK, supra note 89, at 397–98. 
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the most plausible of these candidates, I submit, is crime prevention. 
Means that directly further substantial state interests, like the prevention 
of future harm, clearly are worthy of tax resources. We must accept the 
risks of abuse and corruption unless we can find a better way to achieve
this important end.  The furtherance of this objective hopefully offsets 
the drawbacks of punishment and gives citizens ample reason to create a 
system of criminal justice.94  If I am correct, the prevention of future 
harm plays an indispensable role in the justification of punishment. 
Obviously, consequentialist considerations also play an indispensable
role in the justification of preventive detention.  If I am right that they
also play this role in a justification of punishment—even a justification
that is broadly retributivist—we need not recognize a sharp divide 
between these practices.  I conclude that the punishments imposed pursuant 
to a system of preventive detention need not disregard desert or the 
normative factors that apply to penal justice.  In sum, no good reason has 
been given to think that preventive detention cannot be deserved punishment 
or that the statutes that authorize it cannot be a legitimate part of the 
criminal law.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that no serious barrier of principle shows that preventive 
detention cannot be conceptualized as punishment or defended as
justified punishment.  If I am correct, the rules that authorize it can be 
treated as part of the state’s criminal law.  Although several considerations
are alleged to show that preventive detention cannot be deserved 
punishment, I have given reason to believe that each should be rejected. 
Some of these obstacles are more formidable than others, and my
response has been tentative at times.  At a minimum, I purport to have 
shown that these practices are not nearly as distinct as many theorists
suppose. 
I have said little, however, about whether either or both of these
practices are ultimately defensible.  Despite the skepticism among a handful
of commentators about whether punishment is justified—skepticism that 
is more prevalent in Europe but has begun to spread to the United
States95—I assume that some suitable rationale for criminal law and 
94. For a challenge to whether good consequences suffice to offset the drawbacks 
of punishment, see generally David Wood, Retribution, Crime Reduction and the 
Justification of Punishment, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 301 (2002). 
95. Abolitionism, once almost exclusively confined to Europe, has recently become
more popular in the United States.  See, e.g., DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF
PUNISHMENT (2008); DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION,
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punishment can be found.  If preventive detention can be structured to be 
punishment and the rules that authorize it can become part of the state’s 
criminal law, it might be supposed that the rationale of preventive detention 
is comparable.  For the most part, I believe this supposition is correct.
The task, then, is to defend a theory of criminal law and punishment to
which preventive detention can be assimilated.  Elsewhere I have taken
steps toward defending a theory of criminalization—a set of normative
principles that purport to show whether particular criminal laws are
justified.  The problems in justifying offenses of risk-prevention are 
sufficiently acute to require a special section of that effort.96  Rather than 
repeat my arguments here, I simply claim that whatever normative
standards justify the enactment of crimes of risk-prevention should also
be applied to justify statutes allowing preventive detention.  The need to
conform to these constraints provides further restrictions on the kinds of 
new crimes that may be enacted.  Even if my own principles of 
criminalization turn out to be mistaken, I propose that whatever constraints 
are deemed acceptable should also be employed to assess the penal laws
that authorize preventive detention. We have no strong reasons of
principle to resist statutes that authorize preventive deprivations of 
liberty if we preserve the stringent conditions that allow states to punish. 
In fact, however, the case for preventive detention might be even 
stronger than my arguments suggest.  Contrary to the suspicions of most 
legal philosophers, it should be easier to justify preventive detention
than to justify punishment for harms already caused.  Surely preventing 
future harms is a legitimate function of the state—even through its 
institutions of criminal justice.  As I have indicated, anticipatory offenses
such as attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, and possession share this
rationale.  Most of us should agree that it would be preferable (ceteris 
paribus) to prevent harms before they occur than to punish persons after
they have caused harm.97  Clearly, we should be eager to implement
means to prevent future harms if we are able to do so without infringing 
rights more valuable than those typically infringed by punishment.  But I
have not relied on this point in my discussion of preventive detention.
My more modest claim is that preventive detention can be conceptualized
CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE LAW (2005); MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN, THE IMMORALITY OF
PUNISHMENT (2011). 
96. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 159–77. 
97. For a discussion of preemption in the law, see Arthur Ripstein, Prohibition and
Preemption, 5 LEGAL THEORY 235 (1999). 
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and justified as state punishment so that the rationales for the two
practices can be made to be comparable.
If we are confident about the justifiability of punishing persons who
commit anticipatory or inchoate offenses to prevent future harms, why 
are so many penal theorists skeptical of preventive detention in
principle?  Frankly, I am unsure, and my critics will be able to speak for 
themselves. A few are not persuaded that anticipatory or inchoate crimes
rest upon a secure rationale and thus are not impressed by my efforts to
compare them to offenses that authorize preventive detention.  This 
battle must be fought another day.  Some will complain that I have
created a straw man and that the most cogent objections to preventive
detention are practical rather than principled.  My own survey of the
literature surrounding this practice indicates that both kinds of difficulties
are raised with equal frequency.  Others will reject the controversial
claims I have made about criminal law and punishment. Admittedly,
some of my views about the act requirement, status criminality, desert,
control, and proportionality are outside the mainstream of orthodox 
thought.  Without a defense of conventional wisdom, however, the mere 
fact of discrepancy is not a good reason to reject my positions. Some
may want to detain a broader range of dangerous persons than my
strategy is likely to allow.  I concede the likelihood that only small numbers
of dangerous persons will be justifiably detained as criminals by the line 
of thought I have developed.  Still others will equate preventive detention in
general with a particular system with which they are familiar.  Most or 
perhaps all of these existing systems of preventive detention are
draconian, and I join those theorists who reject them categorically. But I 
have encouraged us to think more broadly, even though this perspective 
is bound to undercut much of what makes political officials inclined to 
resort to preventive detention in the real world.  And still others will
persist in supposing that any system of preventive detention that operates 
within the criminal justice system is problematic because it is necessarily 
disguised.  This latter problem is the easiest to rectify.  I propose to lift 
the cloak that allegedly conceals this practice and to evaluate it by the
same criteria we apply to the rest of the substantive criminal law.  If my
arguments are sound, preventive detention need not be disguised as 
criminal justice.  In fact, the principled case against the morality of the 
practice does not succeed without jeopardizing the case for punishment.
To reject preventive detention while retaining state punishment requires
theorists to accept controversial positions on some of the deepest and 
most divisive issues in the philosophy of criminal law.
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